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INTERNATIONAL Co-OPERATION IN LITIGATION: EUROPE. Edited by 
Hans Smit. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1965. Pp. xxxiv, 486. 
$17.50. 
The title of this work should be qualified in two ways. First, the 
designation "Europe" is not quite accurate, since the book only 
deals with fifteen countries-Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, 
Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Holland, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland-which include no Eastern 
European countries (despite the increasing number of commercial 
exchanges with them) and which together do not even comprise the 
whole of Western Europe. Second, because of the sources from which 
the work was compiled, it tends to emphasize problems of inter-
national cooperation in litigation which are of special interest to 
common-law jurists, while only broadly reviewing the practices of 
the fifteen European countries. The book consists of a number of 
reports which were prepared for Columbia University's "Project on 
International Procedure." These reports attempted to examine how 
the United States, with its notorious reluctance for adopting treaties 
dealing with international judicial cooperation, could modify and 
improve its existing rules to meet the practical needs of foreign 
countries. The Columbia project stimulated the United States 
Congress to create the Commission on International Rules of Judi-
cial Procedure, which was charged with studying means by which the 
system of international cooperation in litigation could be im-
proved. 
The results obtained (set out in the work's appendix) are un-
doubtedly significant. They provide means not only for improving 
the judicial assistance which foreign countries seek from the United 
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States, but also for liberalizing the procedural rules of American 
courts, thus making it easier for these courts to utilize the judicial 
help proffered by foreign countries. With regard to this last point, 
special mention should be made of the reform of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure for District Courts, which include notable innovations in 
the American practice and procedure (app. B, pp. 438-44). The Ad-
visory Committee on Civil Rules frankly stated that "the ordinary 
rules of evidence are often inapposite to the problem of determining 
foreign law" (p. 441); consequently, it proposed that when such a 
problem arises, courts should be permitted to consider "any rele-
vant material or source, including testimony, whether or not sub-
mitted by a party or admissible under Rule 43." This attempt to 
broaden the courts' powers to take cognizance of foreign law without 
imposing a formal obligation to "take judicial notice of it" (p. 442) 
introduces an approach very close to that which prevails among 
European courts (France, p. 150; Italy, p. 279). Thus, the concrete 
solutions which are worked out by various countries under the 
pressure of practical necessities may result in a greater uniformity of 
law than one would expect given the differences between their re-
spective legal systems. 
Despite these encouraging signs, serious difficulties still exist, as 
the reports collected in Smit's book amply demonstrate. The book 
presents a quantity of data (sometimes with such excessive detail that 
the main structures of the systems tend to be obscured) in which 
many problems come to light which are not easily soluble. Thus, 
even when the difficulties inherent in obtaining evidence abroad are 
overcome, problems of evaluating the evidence still will confront 
the domestic judge. For example, in the civil-law countries, the 
evidence is not normally recorded in a verbatim transcript, but 
rather in the judges' summation (Belgium, p. 39; France, p. 161; 
Germany, p. 204; Italy, p. 260; Norway, p. 294), although the courts 
of these countries will usually consent should the foreign judge 
request a verbatim transcript. Similarly, the principle of cross-ex-
amination is alien to the judicial practices of civil law, in which the 
examination of witnesses is carried out by the judge. There is no 
doubt that American judges view the latter means of taking evidence 
with some concern and are thus influenced in their approach toward 
letters rogatory (comments, p. 12 n.76). 
Another difficulty involves the reluctance of foreign courts to 
cooperate in ways which would cause them to violate local public 
policy, a problem of not a little concern since there are wide contrasts 
between the basic principles of the various national legal systems, 
particularly as to rules governing the admission of evidence. In civil 
proceedings of most European countries, the parties are disqualified 
as witnesses and cannot be examined under oath. While this disa-
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bility of a party to act as witness seems to be based on reasons of 
public policy, it remains open to doubt whether a request to take 
testimony of a party will be honored by the courts of these countries 
(Belgium, p. 39; France, p. 161; Italy, p. 261). Clearly, it would be 
a serious inconvenience to common-law judges to have their requests 
for examination of a party as a witness under oath be rejected by 
European courts. 
Moreover, the ability, or inability, of a court to obtain evidence 
from a foreign country has an effect on the application of evidentiary 
rules in the court requesting the evidence. For instance, the United 
States has recently extended the possibility of compelling the pro-
duction of tangible evidence abroad (app. A, p. 412), but compulsory 
production will not be ordered if the law of the foreign country 
effectively forbids production. This, in turn, affects the application 
of other evidentiary rules, for instance, the best evidence rule.1 
The variations benveen countries in the treatment of expert 
witnesses also gives rise to some difficulties in international judicial 
cooperation. In the civil-law countries, the expert is not a witness but 
an auxiliary judge and thus in most countries is required to be a 
citizen (France, p. 135). Consequently, it is difficult to appoint an im-
partial expert in a foreign country unless a qualified citizen happens 
to be available there. Obstacles of this nature, however, may not prove 
insurmountable; international conventions often waive the require-
ment that the expert be a national.2 Yet, doubts still exist as to the 
scope of the expert's task and the proper weight to be given his 
testimony. In this connection the role of the impartial expert must 
be distinguished from that of the partisan expert familiar to Ameri-
cans. An impartial expert is appointed by the court and must assist 
the court in obtaining and evaluating evidence, while an expert 
witness serves one of the parties and is subject to examination and 
cross-examination. Nevertheless, one should not overlook the current 
developments taking place in regard to expert testimony in the com-
mon-law countries, especially in the United States where there is 
now less concern for the adversary aspects of the expert testimony. 
According to the Model Code of Evidence and to the Model Expert 
Testimony Act, the expert may be appointed by the court as an im-
partial expert. This tendency to follow the civil-law practice will 
reduce the difficulties of appointing experts through letters rogatory 
and evaluating expert testimony obtained abroad. 
We must therefore recognize that the various legal systems are 
evolving in such a way that the differences which hitherto have 
represented the main obstacle to international judicial cooperation 
1. On this subject, see Cleary &: Strong, The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation 
in Context, 51 IowA L. REv. 825, 843 (1966). 
2. See Hague Convention on Civil Procedure, art. 16 (1954). 
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are being reduced. Moreover, in recent years the judges in some 
countries have shown, in the face of practical necessities, a laudable 
willingness to allow a more liberal interpretation of "public policy," 
which, in turn, assists the process of evolution in their respective 
systems. For example, it is well known that one of the characteristics 
of the admission of evidence in the civil-law countries is to preface 
the examination of witnesses with the specific questions of fact, thus 
providing a limit to the examination itself.3 Nevertheless, European 
judges have been disposed to extend the examination to other facts 
bearing on the case, even if they are not specified in the letters roga-
tory (Belgium, p. 37 and Switzerland, p. 368). Similarly, the tendency 
of Italian judges to admit evidence obtained abroad, even if different 
methods from those employed in Italy have been used, has recently 
led to the admission of a deposition taken in Germany upon the 
witness' sworn confirmation of its validity.4 
In conclusion, the present book not only offers to legal practi-
tioners a wide and well-documented view of the law in force in 
fifteen selected countries, but also reveals the main trends of future 
reconciliation in international judicial relationships. Probably the 
best method of achieving cooperation is to permit judges in the 
various countries to employ sufficiently flexible rules to meet the 
needs of justice in particular cases, without adhering too strictly to 
doctrines peculiar to their own individual systems. In other words, it 
seems easier to overcome the present difficulties on the judicial plane 
rather than through legislation. Still, it must be emphasized that in 
order for judges to function effectively in this area, they must be 
given the necessary freedom of action. 
One final comment may be apposite. In this field, as in others 
where comparative methods of research are employed, the "factual 
approach" seems the best means of investigating the points of con-
tact between the life of the law in different systems. Such investiga-
tions do much to help the law stay in harmony with the growing 
development of international relationships. 
Vittorio S. Denti, 
Professor of Civil Procedure, 
Faculty of Law, 
Pavia University, Italy 
3. This feature, however, is declining. In France, for instance, it has been abro-
gated by the reform of 1958. See SICARD, LA PREUVE EN JUSTICE APRES LA REFORME JUDI• 
CIAIRE 252 (1960). 
4. See d'Alfonso v. Kieselhorst, [1967] Foro Ital. I 184 (Corte di Cassazione). 
